

PREDICTIVE BIDDING MODEL

For Programmatic Media Buying Optimization Problem

by Eugene Yaremchuk || Data Scientist || QupleTech

We employ artificial intelligence to create next-gen products for aame marketing QupleTecl

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Mechelininkatu 1A, 00094, Helsinki, Finlan http://gupletech.com/

Media Buying



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1 DSP buys traffic for advertisers

- Decision of displaying ad at the fixed platform is accepted by SSP via second price auction (lots of DSP's may take part)
- DSP pays SSP the second price in case it won the auction and the ad was displayed at the platform

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Advertiser pays DSP fixed price by one of the principle:

- CPM (cost per mille) for each displaying of the ad at the platform (impression)
- CPC (cost per click) for each user's click by the ad
- CPA (cost per action) for each specified user's action (install of mobile application, finish some game level etc.)

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From advertiser's point of view CPM is the most natural but simultaneously risky monetization strategy.

CPC and CPA – attempt to shift the part of the risk on the DSP.

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Advertisers risk:

- 1 Inappropriate market audience
- Praudulent traffic

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DSP attempt of additional risk compensation – Dynamic Bidding Strategy.

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DSP attempt of additional risk compensation – Dynamic Bidding Strategy.

An impression price depends on how its risky

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Recall $\{\xi_i, i \ge 1\}$ – ad traffic, $C \in \mathbb{N}$ – desired click volume.

The $ind(\xi_i)$ is an ad label: we assume $ind(\xi_i) = 1$ if the *i*-th request leaded to click, 0 – otherwise

$$N(C) = \min_{n} \left\{ n : \sum_{k=1}^{n} \mathbb{1}[ind(\xi_i) = 1] \ge C \right\}$$

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B – advertiser's camp budget and maxCPC – maximal cost per click. Under condition traffic "may provide" clicks, holds:

$$\mathbb{E}\sum_{k=1}^{N(C)} maxCPC \cdot \mathbb{P}\left(ind(\xi_i) = 1\right) = B$$

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How to interpret this probability?

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mathit{ind}(\xi_i) = 1\right) = \mathbb{P}\left(\mathit{ind}(\xi) = 1 | \ \xi = x_i\right)$$

 x_i – features characterise *i*-th ad bid

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To sum up the "fair price" issue deduces to the posterior probability estimation of the positive class membership

$$\mathbb{P}(ind(\xi) = 1 | \xi = x)$$

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Problem Restrictions

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- High predictor computing speed
- Active learning ability
- 8 High learning speed
- Ability to parallel model training
- High data dimension, high number of categoric features
- 6 Unbalanced training sample

Solutions

Method	Accuracy	Scalability	Efficiency
Bayes' naive	×	\checkmark	\checkmark
Logic trees	\checkmark	×	X
Logistic	×	\checkmark	\checkmark
Logistic, hash-trick	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
stochastic gradient			

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Hashing Trick

$$h: \mathbb{N} \to \{1, ..., 2^b\}, \ \xi: \mathbb{N} \to \{-1, 1\}$$
$$\phi_i^{h,\xi}(x) = \sum_{j: h(j)=i} \xi(i) \cdot x_i, \ x \in \mathbb{R}^n$$

Hashing kernel:

$$(x, x')_{\phi} \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{2^{b}} \phi_{i}^{h,\xi}(x) \cdot \phi_{i}^{h,\xi}(x')$$

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Under these notations holds:

$$\mathbb{E}(x, x')_{\phi} = (x, x')$$

If in addition $||x|| = ||x'|| = 1$:
$$\mathbb{D}(x, x')_{\phi} = O\left(\frac{1}{2^{b}}\right)$$

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Stochastic gradient update:

$$w_{t+1} = w_t - \eta_t \cdot \nabla_w \ell \left(w_t^{\mathsf{T}} \cdot x_t, y_t \right)$$

Here

$$\ell(p, y) = \log(1 + e^{-yp}), y \in \{-1, 1\}$$

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Converges condition:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{+\infty} \eta_t = \infty, \ \sum_{t=1}^{+\infty} \eta_t^2 < +\infty$$

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Converges condition:

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"Optimal" learning rate:

$$\eta_{t,i} = \frac{\alpha}{\beta + \sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{t} g_{s,i}^2}}$$
$$g_s = \ell \left(w_s^{\mathsf{T}} \cdot x_s, y_s \right)$$

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Dynamic Balancing

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$$w_{t+1} = w_t - s(h) \cdot x, \ h \in \mathbb{R}^+$$

For logistic loss function:

$$s(h) = \frac{W(e^{h\eta \cdot x^{\mathsf{T}}x + yp + e^{yp}}) - h\eta \cdot x^{\mathsf{T}}x - e^{yp}}{y \cdot x^{\mathsf{T}}x}$$

Here $W(z)$ – Lambert function:
 $\forall z \in \mathbb{C} : z = W(z) \cdot e^{W(z)}$

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Model Valuation

Bidding model should provide an accurate estimation of the posterior probability. Over estimation would cause budget overruns. Under estimation would cause low conversion delivery rate.

- Classic approach:
 Interpret like binary classification model
- Typical metrics: auROC, Log-Loss, etc.
- Problem:

We don't measure direct accuracy of probability estimators (classification thresholds)

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Partition of the sample hashing space:

$$\mathfrak{X} = \bigsqcup_{j=1}^d O_j$$

Estimating accuracy of aggregated probabilities

$$\mathbb{P}(ind(\xi) = 1 | \xi \in O_j)$$

might be performed via testing hypothesis of coherence theoretic and empiric distributions:

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\xi \in O_{j} | ind(\xi) = 1\right)$$

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Solution: use Pearson's chi-square modified test

$$H_0: P_j = P_t^{(j)}, \ j = \overline{1..d}$$

$$H_1: P_j = P_{const}, \ j = 1..d$$

Chi-square statistic:

$$\chi_{d-1}^{2} = m \cdot \sum_{j=1}^{d} \frac{\left[P_{t}^{(j)} - P_{e}^{(j)}\right]^{2}}{P_{t}^{(j)}}$$

$$m = |\{i : ind(\xi_i) = 1\}|$$

Distribution of the chi-square statistic doesn't depend on the way of sample partition.

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Efficiency criterion statistic:

$$\Psi_{d-1} = \frac{\chi^2_{d-1}(P_t^{(\cdot)})}{\chi^2_{d-1}(P_{const})}$$

Under consistency of the chi-square criterion holds asymptotic behaviour:

$$H_0: \Psi_{d-1} \longrightarrow 0, \ m \to +\infty$$
$$H_1: \Psi_{d-1} \longrightarrow +\infty, \ m \to +\infty$$

If $\Psi_{d-1} < 1$ the dynamic model is better than static.

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Application

Based on QupleTech bidding history it was educated 40 logistic regression models by stochastic gradient descent with adaptive learning rate and hashing-trick features decoding by the principle:

- 80% training set
- 10% validation set
- 10% testing set

It were calculated aggregated model (theoretic) and observed (empiric) probability measures for each learning model by correspondent testing set.



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